Not facing up to climate change crisis a crime?

June 25, 2008

The Real News Network, June 23, 2008

Dr. James Hansen calls for moratorium on coal and phasing out by 2020

Dr. Hansen stated that we have already exceeded a safe amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, which he places at 350 parts per million (ppm). He testified that the US must begin using a carbon tax to lower the nation’s emissions and that the US must stop producing energy from coal by 2020.

James Hansen heads the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York City. He is currently an adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Columbia University and serves as Al Gore’s science adviser. Hansen is best known for his research in the field of climatology and his testimony on climate change to congressional committees in the 1980s that helped raise broad awareness of the global warming issue.


Solutions

June 15, 2008

This is the trailer of a new Friends of the Earth International film presenting options and solutions for the climate and energy crises. Available soon!


Developing Countries Ask For New UNFCCC Financial Architecture

June 12, 2008

By Martin Khor, Third World Network, , 6 June 2008

Developing countries have put forward concrete proposals for establishing a new financial mechanism and “architecture” under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to take charge of the transfer of financial resources to assist the developing countries to address the climate change challenge.

Many countries, including Bangladesh (for the LDCs), China, India, Barbados (for small island developing states), Argentina, the Philippines, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, called for a new financial mechanism and new funds relating to various areas (adaptation, technology, mitigation, etc), which would be under the authority and guidance of the UNFCCC’s Conference of Parties (COP).

It was the first time in recent years that so many developing countries and their groupings had put forward such concrete and systemic proposals on the Convention’s financial mechanism, said a long-time participant of the UNFCCC process.

Several of the countries referred to the large amounts of funds which are being planned for organisations outside the UNFCCC, particularly the World Bank, and said that these funds should instead by placed under the Convention, which is the body in charge of cleat change negotiations and the implementation of the outcomes.

China notably stated that funds provided to organizations outside the Convention would not be counted as being in fulfilment of the developed countries’ commitments under the UNFCCC to provide financial resources to developing countries to help them take action on climate issues. India concurred with this view.

The Philippines said climate-related funds should be placed in the Convention and not other institutions, and if we are not serious (in making outside funds comply with the Convention’s principles and priorities) it did not see what future there would be for the Bali Action Plan.

The proposals of developing countries were made on 5 June at a workshop on investment and financial flows, which is an official part of the meeting of the ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action (AWG-LCA) under the Convention. The group is tasked with implementing the Bali Action Plan and coming up with a decision by the end of 2009.

Besides the members of the G77 and China, other countries providing proposals included Mexico, South Korea and Switzerland, while Japan, the EU and US also spoke.

The first workshop presentation was by Bernaditas Muller of the Philippines, on behalf of the G77 and China. She said the G77 and China had identified basic principles under which they would like to work in the context of enhancing financial resources (a major element of the Bali Action Plan).

Muller (who is coordinator of the G77 and China in the AWG-LCA) said that at the first AWG-LCA meeting in Bangkok, members of the group had spoken about establishing various funds, such as an adaptation fund, a technology fund and a risk insurance fund. The G77 and China believed that this enhanced action should be guided by the following principles:

* Operate under the authority and guidance of and by fully accountable to the Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC.

* Have an equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system of governance.

* Enable direct access to funding by the recipients.

* Ensure recipient countries’ involvement during the definition, identification and implication of the actions.

Muller said Group is developing a proposal based on the above principles, which take into account various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 4.3, 4.4., 4.7, 4.9 and in accordance with article 11.

Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs, said the investments of today determine the extent of climate change tomorrow. It put forward “principles and an architecture of a future funding mechanism.” These included: (1) Adequacy of funds, to meet the needs of adaptation, mitigation, and technology transfer; (2) The equity principle; (3) Likely sources of funding should be from developed countries in implementing their commitment under Article 4.3, and other possible sources include a levy on airline travel, an international fuel levy, an extension of the Adaptation Fund’s levy to other mechanisms, venture capital and the carbon market.

Barbados, on behalf of the small island developing states (SIDS), represented by Selwin Hart, said the funds for adaptation were inadequate. Any resources must be additional to traditional ODA. Referring to financing that is market-based, it said that markets don’t work well in small economies. Financing for mitigation is more readily available and easier to access than for adaptation (for example the private sector is not interested to build a seawall or restore coral reefs).

Barbados put forward a shared vision on adaptation financing in the UNFCCC: (1) New and additional funds above the current commitments on ODA and 0.7% target; (2) Predictability: and stability in funding, which should be sourced from assessed contributions from developed countries and levies of carbon markets; (3) The funds should be in the form of grants rather than loans (as SIDS have to adapt to climate problems caused by emissions and lifestyles of other countries). This should also be consistent with the polluter pays principle; (4) Priority access should be given to the most vulnerable countries; (5) The governance should be under the UNFCCC.

The SIDS also advanced these specific proposals: (1) Establish a Convention adaptation fund. The aim is to implement Convention articles including 4.3 and 4.4, in line with the polluter pays principle. Access to recipients should be direct. Governance should be under the authority of the COP; (2) Establish an insurance mechanism; (3) Set up a Technology Fund; (4) We also support a Mitigation Fund.

The SIDS also stated that there are many bilateral and other instruments, but they
are not under UNFCCC. These should be channelled through Convention process.

China made a formal presentation, putting forward a proposal on the elements and
structure of multilateral funds operating under the Convention.

Represented by Ms. Huang Wenhang of the Finance Ministry, China said the Convention and the Bali Action plan require developed countries to commit to give financial resources that are new and include grants. Existing funding is very limited, with $3.3 billion by the GEF in 1991-2010, $90 million in the Convention’s special climate change fund, $180 million in the Convention’s LDC fund including new pledges and an estimated $37 million in the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund.

These compare with the estimates of finance needs, including $65 billion in 2030 for mitigation estimated by the UNFCCC secretariat, and an Oxfam estimate of $50 billion per year for adaptation. There is a huge gap between needs and available resources, said China.

China added that scaling up of funding is needed. If it remains at the same level, it will not meet the future requirements for adaptation and mitigation.

China then proposed the establishment of a set of new funds under the UNFCCC. The new financing would have the following elements: (1) The source of funding is the implementation of developed countries’ commitments under UNFCCC; (2) The scale of funding should be a certain percentage of the GDP of developed countries, for example 0.5% of GDP, in addition to existing ODA; (3) The funds would be used to enhance mitigation, adaptation, R&D in technology, and technology transfer; (4) Any funding pledged outside the UNFCCC shall not be regarded as being in fulfilment of commitments by developed countries under article 4.3 of the Convention.

China also proposed the following coordinated funding arrangements: (1) In the design, there would be the establishment of a number of specialized funds, including an Adaptation Fund and a Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund; (2) On Governance, (a) The Fund would be established under the authority and guidance of and fully accountable to the COP, (b) There would be equitable and balanced representation of all parties in the governance, (c) There would be easy access and low management costs.

Japan asked China to explain its statement that any funds outside the UNFCCC cannot be counted as part of developed countries’ implementation of their Article 4.3 commitment. Would this mean China wants to make UNFCCC an aid agency?

China responded that the UNFCCC is not an aid agency, but it is the most appropriate forum to discuss climate change. The developed countries have an obligation to developing countries in the Convention. If Japan wants to pledge its money outside the Convention, that should not be counted as fulfilling part of its commitment under the UNFCCC.”

India, represented by Mr.Surya Sethi, presented a comprehensive analysis of the status of climate financing, which he showed fell far short of financing needs, such as the Stern estimate of 1% of world GDP which in 2007 translates to $540 billion.

He said the World Bank group is not in a position to handle the funds required. Any funding structure of the international financial institutions will remain outside of the UNFCCC. The funding mandate of the IFIs is economic development and the capacity of these should not divert to climate change. The IBRD disbursement in 2007 is minus $6.2 billion, which means they receive more than they disburse. No wonder the World Bank wants to expand to climate change, he said.

India said that alternative means for predictable resource flows is needed. We need a new global fund, capitalised by developed countries at a level of 0.3% to 1% of GDP, said India.

India proposed the establishment of a new financial architecture in the UNFCCC. It should have the following elements:

* It must operate under the guidance and must be accountable to the COP.

* There would be balanced representation in the governance.

* Direct access by parties to the funds.

* It should be demand driven, with recipients involved in definition of needs.

* It should be funded by developed countries and may accept other resources from the market and other sources.

* It should be organized in functional windows for technology, venture capital for emerging technologies, and a fund for research and development.

* Other funds should be integrated under the Convention.

* A Board would govern, and there should be a professional secretariat, aided by technical committees. This design was achieved under the Montreal Protocol, and under the Kyoto Protocol’s adaptation fund.

* The unifying force of the various funds to be set up is a common governing architecture which is under the control of COP. Each window will grow under this architecture.

Argentina proposed the establishment of a multilateral fund, as a framework and an umbrella system. It can cover various areas including adaptation and technology. It will develop financial resources of existing funds that exist and that may come up in future. It can include elements mentioned by China and other countries.

Malaysia welcomed the idea of establishing a new funding mechanism. It should be under COP. It should also enable direct access by recipients. This mechanism will be assisted by expert or technical panels. Funding will be by Annex I parties to fulfil their commitment in accordance with Article 4.3, and additional sources can be determined. The fund should complement the existing funds. Competing mechanisms outside the UNFCCC poses a serious challenge to the Convention and this is cause for concern.

Philippines said the finance commitment was not being implemented, there has been inadequate funding and the agreed full incremental cost has not been given to developing countries. The Convention’s parties had also decided that consistency must be ensured between the principles and priorities of the COP with bilateral and other funds on climate operating outside the Convention and that they must not impose new conditionalities.

Referring to recent initiatives outside the Convention to set up new climate funds, she remarked that if we are not serious about this issue, she did not see what future there would be for the Bali Action Plan. There are funds out there. They should not be put in bodies that impose conditionality on developing countries. They should be put in the hands of the parties of the Convention.

South Africa, on behalf of the Africa Group, emphasized the group’s support for the G77 and China’s principles presented by Philippines. The scale of funding for adaptation must be scaled up 2 or 3 times. There is need for assessing costs, planning, NAPAs, implementation for adaptation, mitigation technologies, wider deployment of existing technologies and R and D for new technologies.

Brazil said there was a need for funds to be in compliance with UNFCCC. It stressed the need for a fund with a governance structure that is fair and transparent and reinforces the COP’s capacity to guide climate change.

Saudi Arabia said there was a need to bring all the ideas of the funds together. There is need for a solid structure in UNFCCC where all the initiatives can be put together in a structure, as laid out by the G77/China principles. The goal is to bring under one umbrella a solid new architecture. It would operate under the authority and guidance of the Convention and be fully accountable to the COP.

Mexico pointed to the unpredictability of current funding and the need to overcome the atomization of current financing in many funds. The current financial system is totally insufficient to sustain the scale of actions needed.

It proposed a World Climate Change Fund covering mitigation, adaptation, and technology. All countries would contribute to it, with contributions to be agreed multilaterally and could be determined by criteria like Greenhouse gas emissions, population and GDP size, as well as the polluter pay principle, equity and efficiency and each country’s capacity. The Fund should mobilize no less than $10 billion a year, with $200 billion by 2030.

Mitigation activities to be supported should yield measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation results. Activities to be funded include forest, agricultural soils, biofuels, energy, green buildings, lower-emission vehicles.

Korea, represented by Raekwon Chung, advanced a proposal on carbon credit for NAMA (nationally appropriate mitigation actions) by developing countries, supported by finance that is measurable, reportable and verifiable. In this scheme, mitigation can be initiated by developing countries even without finance and technology, similar to a unilateral CDM.

He suggested that Annex I countries undertake a deeper emission reduction target to facilitate more funds. Instead of developed countries offering to contribute to funds, they could instead buy credits for NAMA.

Switzerland presented a proposal on a “funding scheme for Bali Action Plan”. It proposed a global carbon dioxide levy of $2 per ton of carbon dioxide, in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities. There would be three pillars in the scheme. Overall revenues would be $48.5 billion, with $18.4 billion to a multilateral adaptation fund or MAF (with a $9.2 billion prevention pillar and a $9.2 billion insurance pillar), and $30.1 billion going to national climate change funds.

High income countries will transfer 60% of their levy to the MAF, medium income countries 35% and low income countries 15%. Countries with below 1.5 ton of carbon dioxide emission are exempted from payment; Switzerland said these would mainly be LDCs.

Brazil commented that the Swiss proposal had taken current emission rather than historical responsibility on board when choosing who to tax. Switzerland replied historical responsibility was counted if the future emissions is counted but not so in relation to past emissions.

Germany, for the European Union, said the challenge is to stabilize greenhouse gases at 450 ppm, restrict temperature rise to 2 degrees and to reduce emissions. Finance is required for a transition to a low carbon economy. Most funds for mitigation will be from the private sector and this won’t change in future, but pubic funds are still needed to catalyze and leverage private investments.

In mobilizing financial flows, the main tool is the price of carbon as the carbon market is delivering a significant part of the flows. On innovative financing, the EU can discuss auctioning of carbon allowances and a levy on bunker fuel.

Norway proposed a scheme for “financing adaptation by auctioning” in which a small percentage of asset value can be auctioned or sold to finance adaptation. The task can be given to an international bank.

The United States, commenting on other countries’ remarks on the World Bank climate funds, said that the clean technology fund under this is not meant for unmet contributions under the Convention. It will be supportive of the objectives of the Convention. It is hosted at the World Bank as it will provide rapid disbursement of funds and leverage other funds.

As the private sector gives most investments, the issue is how governments can encourage private sector flows to clean technologies. Countries with an enabling environment, open markets and respect for IPRs will attract more clean technologies.

Surya Sethi of India, responding to Japan and US relating to the World Bank climate funds, said that the funds to developing countries for climate must come in the form of resource transfer or grant. “If I borrow money I have to return it and it is not funding my full additional cost,” said India. “Any mechanism must ensure the full incremental cost must be met and it won’t be met by loans even if these are concessional.”

The Chair of the AWG-LCA, Luiz Machado of Brazil, said the discussion had been rich, there were some areas of convergence and some new and innovative ideas. This was a very valuable brainstorming, which could be used for discussing future work. A contact group of the AWG LCA will further take up the finance issue.


What the ADB needs to do to keep it’s Asia Clean Energy Forum clean

June 11, 2008

By Renato Redentor Constantino*, Executive Director, NGO Forum on ADB, June 2008

The Asian Clean Energy Forum(ACEF) 2008 will be remembered as the event where the ADB finally decided to drop the term ‘clean coal’, after years of getting pilloried for its patronage of the thoroughly dishonest label. “Let us stop using clean coal or cleaner coal and just call it what it is - more efficient coal,” said ADB Vice President Bindu Lohani in one short sentence, which unequivocally recognized the validity of what many environmental and community NGOs have long insisted on - that there is no such thing as clean coal.

Unfortunately, however important the step, correctionary labeling is all that the ADB’s ACEF has done thus far. Since 2006, three ACEF annual events have by now come and gone and none of the events, whether singly or cumulatively, have made developing Asia feel more secure or safe against the anticipated consequences of blind, fossil-fueled economic growth. In fact, as of this writing, the ADB continues to put together massive financial plans geared towards the rapid expansion of what the bank still recognizes as the cheapest, most affordable source of energy.

And here is where the absurd irony lies. It was de rigeur for virtually every speaker in ACEF 2008 to start their speeches with the reminder that “it was time to act,” in reference to the climate crisis, which today constitutes the most gargantuan cost to the public that coal companies – and institutions such as the ADB – have in effect been passing on to the public.

ACEF occured in the midst of negotiations surrounding the future of our planet’s climate in Bonn, Germany. At stake – the possibility of a future international climate regime that would, many hope, call for more dramatic global greenhouse gas emissions starting with the developed world and the particularly rich, together with compensation for climatic impacts that can no longer be prevented.

It is an ambitious goal, and nowhere is it preordained that the talks will succeed. But more and more are taking hope in the fact that more and more have begun to realize that there are really no alternative pathways to drastic emissions cuts, save for more extreme ecological and economic crises.

Bonn constitutes an interesting backdrop, particularly for events such as the Asia Clean Energy Forum (ACEF) organized by the Asian Development Bank. Initiated in 2006 in response to campaign broadsides from civil society, which exposed the naked climate hypocrisy of the Bank’s transactional programs, the ACEF has since taken place every first week of June.

In partnership with USAID – the lead co-organizer, ACEF is a platform for “investing in solutions that address climate change and energy security.” ACEF attracts sustainable energy advocates and institutes as well as carbon brokers, dirty energy charlatans and leading members of the global consultancy industry. What the ACEF actually does for the ADB, however, is that it serves as a stage by which to demonstrate that the bank is doing something about climate change, instead of funding it. Apart from funding humongous coal giants such as the 4,000-MW Mundra Ultra Mega project of corporate giant Tata, the ADB also boasted of its increasingly smaller carbon footprint, given the way it has aggressively pursued energy efficiency in the ADB’s headquarters. But why measure only the ADB building? What about the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions of the coal plants it has financed and the large hydro projects it has supported? What about the overwhelmingly fossil fuel-biased financing that it has extended throughout Asia of road building, and road building, and even more building of highways and freeways?

There was notably no mention throughout the event of the stalled new ADB Energy Strategy, which was ridiculed by civil society as mediocre and of poor quality. Neither was there mention of the ADB’s still operational Energy Policy, which was approved in 1995, particularly the provisions that have demanded of the ADB and its member countries for the last 13 years the full quantification of all externality costs related to coal and destructive energy projects such as large hydro in order to genuinely level the project playing field.

Stratos Tavoulareas, representing USAID, actually epitomized the way discussions were skewed towards talking about straw men and pipe dreams. According to the official, there were only three options that Asia was facing today. The first was “to stop using coal.” The second was to improve efficiency. And the third was “to use carbon capture and sequestration technology.” But what about dramatically reducing dependence on coal? And what about utilizing decentralized energy systems instead, which prioritize efficiency and renewables and combined heat and power?

In the end, so many questions were left unasked and unanswered. This should come as no surprise to anyone who has monitored the previous ACEFs, and it is disturbing.

The truth is simple and straightforward and it makes the ADB seem so irrelevant.

It is not politics but science that dictates that all countries must contribute in the end — the industrialized nations, arising primarily from their undeniable historic responsibility, including developing countries in the pursuit of real, not rhetorical, sustainable and equitable development — a path of development that avoids the worst excesses of the wealthy nations of today who, once upon a time, thought they could afford to live as if there were no limits — or deadly consequences — to their avarice. #

* Renato Redentor Constantino is the Executive Director of NGO Forum on ADB, an international network of civil society and community organization critically monitoring the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Contact: red@forum-adb.org


Hunger in the wake of climate change

June 10, 2008

TheRealNews, June 9, 2008

Bangladesh faces a food crisis compounded by extreme weather and environmental decline.


World Bank Called ‘Unqualified’ to Run Climate Fund

June 8, 2008

By Alison Raphael, June 6, 2008. OneWorld.Net

WASHINGTON - Organizations from 40 countries called on leaders of the developing world yesterday to oppose World Bank plans to establish a “Clean Technology Fund” that they fear will have little or no impact on halting global warming.

“The Clean Technology Fund [includes] no definition of clean technology,” said Kenny Bruno, international program director for Oil Change International, one of the signatory groups.

By leaving definitions of key terms hazy, the groups argue, the World Bank leaves the door open to use scarce resources in support of energy initiatives likely to have only a minor impact on climate change.

“What they are really proposing is a ’slightly less dirty’ technology fund, which will include financing of coal plants that are somewhat less polluting than the dirtiest plants out there,” Bruno charged.

More than 120 environment, human rights, faith-based, and indigenous rights groups from countries as diverse as Argentina, Belarus, Sweden, and Togo issued a joint statement urging developing country governments to reject the World Bank plan until several major issues are resolved.

At the 2005 Gleneagles meeting of the “G-8″ industrialized countries, the World Bank was tasked with designing a plan to boost investment in clean energy worldwide. But instead of supporting the development of innovative, forward-thinking technologies the Bank has plowed more money than ever into fossil fuel extraction, according to its own statistics.

“The World Bank is spectacularly unqualified to manage climate funds due to their long-term practice of financing carbon emissions from oil and gas,” said Brent Blackwelder, president of the U.S. division of Friends of the Earth, a global environmental advocacy group.

Blackwelder will testify today at a Congressional hearing, pointing out that investing in more coal production in India and China, even if new plants are marginally cleaner than existing plants, represents a health risk for local populations and will “significantly increase the total load of carbon emissions to the atmosphere.”

The groups also expressed concern that putting the World Bank in charge of a new lending mechanism will undermine existing agreements made at a global climate change meeting in Bali in late 2007, diverting money away from the globally agreed “Adaptation Fund” intended to support the transfer of clean energy technology to the developing world.

Instead, the Bank plan foresees new Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), loans to developing countries for technology transfer and to help them adapt to changes brought about by global warming.

This is “inappropriate,” say the groups, since the bulk of emissions contributing to climate change come from industrialized countries. In other words, they argue, CIFs would increase the debt of poor countries trying to mitigate the impact of emissions by rich countries.

Instead, funding for technology transfer should be channeled through the established UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the groups say, agreeing with Blackwelder that, “as an institution that manages development assistance, not climate change, the World Bank is the wrong home for a Clean Technology Fund.”

 


Global Civil Society Statement on World Bank Climate Investment Funds

June 5, 2008

June 5, 2008

UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has called on all nations to “come together in a global, collective, inclusive and low-carbon approach to growth and development.”  Public money could and should have a vital and central role to play in encouraging and supporting a global shift to low carbon technologies.

We, the undersigned representatives of development, environment, faith-based, human rights, community, and indigenous rights groups oppose the World Bank’s current initiative to establish Climate Investment Funds (CIFs).

While we recognize that efforts have been made to improve the original proposal (e.g. in governance structures), we are simultaneously alarmed that Bank management is offering minimal public comment period, in English only, on an issue of obvious global significance.  This kind of disregard for the importance of the input of global civil society is unfortunately typical of the World Bank and illustrative of our concerns regarding the Bank’s administration of climate funds.  We further note the following concerns: 

·       It is highly inappropriate to issue loans for adaptation, given that rich countries are overwhelmingly responsible for climate change. It is currently suggested that the proposed Pilot Program for Climate Resilience will offer loan finance for adaptation, even though the overwhelming responsibility for climate change we experience today lies clearly with rich (World Bank donor) countries.

·       The World Bank’s energy lending patterns must be addressed before it takes control of climate funding. Unfortunately, and in sharp contrast to the transformational role that any useful public finance mechanism must play, the World Bank Group continues to commit scarce international development finance in a manner that locks in long-term energy pathways inconsistent with international climate needs.  In fact, since the Gleneagles G8 meeting in 2005, where the Bank Group was tasked with designing a clean energy investment framework and leading the fight against climate change, lending for fossil fuels has actually increased at a rate that exceeds the increase in renewable technologies – thus exacerbating an already large imbalance in funding.[1] Meanwhile, on November 29, 2007, the European Parliament overwhelmingly passed a Resolution calling for an end to fossil fuel financing by the European Investment Bank and Export Credit Agencies.

·       The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) has no definition of clean technology, and there are serious concerns that it will be oriented heavily toward funding large-scale coal plants[2]. Without a clear definition of “clean technology,” the Clean Technology Fund may thus be used to finance projects that do not clearly mitigate climate change or may take up scarce resources that bring minor or incremental change, when fundamental change is needed.  Public finance meant to combat climate change should not be used to subsidize any carbon intensive technology, even if they represent a marginal improvement in emissions. Clean must mean “clean”, not “slightly less dirty”. A prime example of this practice is the recent approval of a $450 million loan by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) for a 4000 MW supercritical coal fired power plant.[3]

·       The governance structure of the World Bank is not sufficiently inclusive of developing country governments. While we recognize that improvements to the proposed governance structure of the CIFs have been recently proposed, any such improvements are inadequate when located within an institution that is both undemocratic and lacks transparency.  The World Bank, as an institution, is burdened by fundamental issues of trust with the very constituencies that it professes to serve. Therefore, any initiative administered by the Bank will at best have to work very hard to overcome legitimate scepticism, and at worst will be undermined and rendered ineffective by the reputation of its parent. 

·       The World Bank initiative could undermine the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The proposed funds could divert funding that should come through a global agreement based on the model of common but differentiated responsibilities.  The UNFCCC Adaptation Fund that was established at the Conference of Parties in Bali in 2007 has already held its first meeting, and is moving forward. However, it will require additional funding beyond the levy from the Clean Development Mechanism.  Additional funds that might have gone to this Adaptation Fund ,could now be diverted into the World Bank.

·       Clean energy funding for the purposes of addressing climate change in developing countries should be in the form of grants. The Bank currently proposes both grants and loans for “clean” energy technologies. At the very least, climate funds should provide grants equal to the difference in price between conventional technologies and truly clean technologies that will help put countries on a clean development path. A policy such as this could do much to “level the playing field” for truly clean renewable technologies.

·       Funding to help developing countries respond to the challenges of climate change must be explicitly additional to the long-standing Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) commitment of 0.7% GDP. 

·       Developing countries have already voiced grave concerns. In Bangkok, at the plenary sessions of the UNFCCC’s ad hoc working group on long-term cooperation, the G77 and China criticized the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds. Individual developing countries have also expressed alarm that the Bank initiative would undermine their efforts in the UNFCCC.

We believe that urgent action on climate change is required. However, the current rush to establish the CIFs could lead to establishing top-down funds that fail to promote the vital, wider environmental and development benefits and sustainable transformation required to address climate change. 

At this delicate moment in history, pushing forward with World Bank-led climate investment funds could lead to a serious erosion of trust in the international community.  Therefore:

We urge developed country governments not to support the launch of the World Bank initiative until and unless all the aforesaid concerns are fundamentally addressed.

We call on developing country governments to give attention to our concerns and raise them with donor countries, the World Bank, and other relevant institutions.

Endorsers:

Argentina

Amigos de la Tierra

Australia

Friends of the Earth Australia

Bangladesh

BanglaPraxis

Community Development Library (CDL)

Belarus

IPO “Ecoproject Partnership

Belgium

Coalition of the Flemish North-South Movement

Friends of the Earth Flanders & Brussels

Brazil

AGAPAN, Associação Gáucha de Proteção ao Ambiente Natural

Esplar - Centro de Pesquisa e Assessoria

Rede Brasil sobre Instituições Financeiras Multilaterais

Cameroon

Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement

Canada

KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives

Denmark

DanChurchAid

NOAH, Friends of the Earth Denmark

EU

CEE Bankwatch Network

Germany

GENDERCC - Women for Climate Justice

SÜDWIND e.V.

Urgewald

World Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED)

Honduras

Movimiento Madre Tierra Honduras, Member of            ATALC

Movimiento Madre Tierra, Friends of the Earth Honduras

India

Bharatiya Krishak Samaj (Indian Farmer’s Organization)

Indian Society for Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development

Indonesia

Anti Debt Coalition Indonesia (KAU)

Association of Prison Ministries (APM)

Indonesian Foundation of Education and Self-Reliance (YPSI)

INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development)

Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR)

Jakarta Christian Communication Forum (FKKJ)

Kalikasan-People’s Network for the Environment (Kalikasan-PNE)

Law Enforcement Watch (LEW)

Pantau Foundation- Indonesia

Perhimpunan Solidaritas Buruh (Association of Workers Solidarity)

Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia WALHI/Friends of the Earth

INSIST (Yogyakarta)

International

ActionAid International

Eco Equity

Friends of the Earth International

Greenpeace International

Jubilee South - Asia/Pacific Movement on Debt and Development

Solidarity Workshop

Italy

Coopi Lazio

Fair

Legambiente

Lunaria

Intersos

Tavola della Pace

Terra Nuova

Un Ponte Per

VIDES International

Campagna per la riforma della Banca Mondiale (CRBM)

Kazakhstan

BAITEREK

Kyrgyzstan

Ecological Movement “BIOM”

Malaysia

Friends of the Earth Malaysia

Third World Network

Nepal

Least Developed Country Watch

Rural Reconstruction Nepal

South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication

Netherlands

A SEED

MAID (Management Projects for Individual Empowerment and Democratic Development)

Milieudefensie (FoE)

Nigeria

Environmental Rights Action

Norway

Friends of the Earth Norway

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)

SLUG (Norwegian Campaign for Debt Cancellation)

Papua New Guinea

Center for Environmental Law & Community

The Papua New Guinea Eco-Forestry Forum

Rights Inc. (CELCOR)/Friends of the Earth

Peru

ECOVIDA

Instituto Ambientalista Natura

Philippines

Center for Environmental Concerns-Inc

Climate Action Network Southeast Asia (CANSEA)

Kalikasan-People’s Network for the Environment

NGO Forum on the ADB

Philippine Network on Climate Change (PNCC)

Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM)

The Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC)

Portugal

Quercus-Associação Nacional de Conservação da Natureza

Romania

Foundation TERRA Millennium III

Russia

Biodiversity Conservation Center

Center for Assistance to Environmental Initiatives

Counterpart for Development Association

Assessment Center ECOM (St. Petersburg) Society of Naturalists

Serbia

Center for Ecology and Sustainable Development (CEKOR)

Slovakia

Friends of the Earth-CEPA

South Africa

Centre for Civil Society Economic Justice Project University of KwaZulu-Natal

South Korea

KFEM/Friend of the Earth South Korea

Spain

Xarxa de l’Observatori del Deute en la Globaltización

Switzerland

Alliance Sud

Tajikistan

Foundation to Support Civil Initiatives

Youth Ecological Centre of Tajikistan

Timor Leste

Haburas Foundation

La’o Hamutuk (Timor Leste Institute of Development Monitoring and Analysis)

Luta Hamutuk Institute

Togo

Jeunes Volontaires pour l’Environnement-International

UK

Bretton Woods Project

Christian Aid

Down to Earth: the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia

Plan B

Platform

The Forest Peoples Programme

The New Economics Foundation

Ukraine

Nikolaev Club for Promotion of the Sustainable Development and Civil Society “Joint Action”

Black Sea Women Club

Ecoclub

National Ecological Centre of Ukraine

Ukrainian Children’s Union “Ecological Guard”

USA

Amazon Watch

Circle the Earth

Crude Accountability

Friends of the Earth US

International Accountability Project

International Forum on Globalization

International Rivers

Jubilee USA Network

Oil Change International

Rainforest Action Network (RAN)

Sustainable Energy and Economy Network (SEEN)


[1] World Bank Group support for fossil fuel extraction in FY06 actually increased 93% compared to FY05. The private sector lending arm of the World Bank Group – the IFC actually increased its support for oil alone by more than 75% from FY 05-06.  Current World Bank Group support for fossil fuels, including power, has increased at least 42% over FY05 levels. World Bank support for renewables and efficiency is also increasing but by less than its support for fossil fuels – 28-40% by the Bank’s own estimates.  So the gap in funding is actually growing larger, and exactly the wrong signals are being sent to the market.

[2] Annex A, p. 14 of the draft “Proposal for a Clean Technology Fund,” April 29, 2008, Rev. 1, states: “Financing from the CTF could cover one or more of the following proposed transformational investments:”… “(iii) Achieve significant greenhouse gas reductions by adopting best available coal technologies with substantial improvements in energy efficiency; (iv) Support readiness for implementation of carbon capture and storage”…

[3] The Tata Mundra Ultra Mega $450 million loan was approved by the IFC’s Board on April 8th, 2008.  For a critique of the project, please click here.


World Bank’s Climate Funds Proposal Distorts UNFCCC Principles

June 5, 2008

By Celine Tan, Third World Network, 28 May 2008

The World Bank’s revised climate investment funds (CIF) proposals reflect a poor understanding of the international climate change regime and remains inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) despite claims to the contrary.

According to a key developing country negotiator in the UNFCCC who has been involved in the process since its inception, the Bank’s new proposals, which were discussed at their third design meeting in Potsdam, Germany on 21-22 May, reflect a selective reading of the multilateral climate change agreement and ignores the negotiating history of the Convention.

The negotiator, who is head of delegation of a developing country at the UNFCCC and who has led the G77 and China in climate negotiations in the past, said that the World Bank claims consistency with the UNFCCC, but in fact, the new CIF proposals demonstrate limited knowledge of the treaty provisions and, in some cases, distort the meaning of obligations under the Convention.

Notably, the Bank’s assertion that the “UNFCCC recognises the need for financial resources to be provided to developing countries to assist them in meeting the costs of mitigation and adaptation measures” is inaccurate.

According to the negotiator, “developing country parties to the UNFCCC do not need assistance’” in the conventional understanding of the term. Instead, it is the legally binding obligation of developed country parties to provide the necessary “new and additional” financial resources to meet the costs incurred by developing countries to implement all their obligations under the Convention, and not just for mitigation and adaptation. Financial resources are therefore obligations of developed countries under the UNFCCC and not considered as development aid.

“The provision of financial resources to developing countries, as well as transfer of technology, are commitments of developed country parties to the Convention, so there is no donor-donee relationship within the Convention. This flows from the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities which is reflected in the Convention, from its preamble, to the objectives, principles, commitments, implementing articles and the functions of all the main bodies of the Convention”, said the negotiator.

Forty countries had reached an agreement to create the climate investment funds at a meeting in Potsdam, Germany last week. The World Bank had sought to justify the creation of the climate investment funds after it came under heavy fire from developing countries and civil society groups since the draft proposals were leaked in February this year.

Specifically, in order to address criticisms that the funds were inconsistent with the provisions of the UNFCCC and threatened to undermine negotiations under the Convention, the new proposals for the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) and the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) now include four introductory pages reciting various provisions of the UNFCCC and reiterating the funds’ consistency with the UNFCCC process.

Both fund proposals now incorporate references to the United Nations as “the appropriate body for broad policy setting on climate change” and state that the multilateral development banks (MDBs) as implementing agencies of the CIF “should not pre-empt the results of the climate change negotiations” with climate change actions to “be guided by the principles of the UNFCCC”.

However, the language here implies recognition of the UNFCCC principles as merely guidance for policy agendas of the CIF rather than as binding internationally negotiated commitments of state parties which must be respected. They also demonstrate a lack of familiarity with the principles negotiated under the Convention and the legal status of commitments under the UNFCCC.

Additionally, the Bank mistakenly conflates the UN with the UNFCCC, with the UNFCCC being a negotiated, internationally binding treaty separate from the UN as a general entity. Developing countries have argued that financial resources disbursed in fulfilment of obligations of developed countries under the UNFCCC should be placed under the authority (and not just guidance) of the Convention’s Conference of Parties (COP).

The fact that the CIF will not come under the authority of the UNFCCC COP in itself is a reflection of the climate investment funds’ inconsistency with the UNFCCC provisions and in disregard of developing countries’ demands under the Convention.

Although Article 11 of the UNFCCC (used by the World Bank to justify the CIF) states that “developed country parties may also provide and developing country parties avail themselves of financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels”, the developing country negotiator points out that the parties had decided that such funding “through channels outside the Convention’ should be consistent with the policies, programme priorities and guidance provided by the parties”.

Furthermore, developing countries under the Convention have called strongly for “direct access” to any funds established for the purposes of meeting obligations under the UNFCCC and not access mediated by secondary institutions, such as MDBs and other agencies, because “in the end, countries do the implementation, not the institutions”, said the negotiator.

The negotiator expressed surprise that proponents of the climate investment funds claimed that there was an absence of similar instruments providing financing for climate change activities to be financed by CIF resources: “There already exist within the Convention a number of mechanisms and processes for identifying needs, setting programmes and priorities, setting eligibility criteria, conducting needs assessments (vulnerabilities, technologies, financial), capacity building and mechanisms for reporting, measuring and verification, which we must all strengthen rather than set aside so that another institution which claims it knows the Convention than the Parties do can do it”.

The negotiator also pointed out that the Bank has made a serious error in its proposals when referring to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) as “the financial mechanism of the Convention” when the GEF is only “an operating entity” of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC. Although the GEF remains the only entity under the mechanism at present, this does not preclude the parties to the Convention designating another facility as an operating entity to carry out the task of providing financing under the treaty.

Developing countries have consistently rejected the notion that GEF is “designated as the financial mechanism of the Convention” as the Bank asserts, because “we do not believe that it fulfils an important criterion of the financial mechanism - that it has an equitable and balanced representation of all parties within a transparent system of governance’“.

The GEF, like the proposed climate investment funds, has a system of governance that is not under the authority of the UNFCCC COP and remains contingent upon donor contributions. Although the GEF is supposed to come under the guidance of the COP, the guidance remains to be interpreted by the GEF trust fund committees and implemented according to their interpretation.

Similarly, while the revised CIF proposals allude to the UNFCCC, they do not locate the CIF within the framework of the Convention. The proposed governance structure of the CIF, while revised from earlier drafts which gave donor countries overriding control over the funds and now provides for equitable representation from donor and recipient governments on the respective trust fund committees, remains problematic for this reason.

According to the negotiator, under the Convention, “it is a balanced representation of all parties” and not based on pre-selection of representatives. “If you have a balanced representation of donor and recipient countries, then you have already chosen the donors and recipients.”

This highlights the fundamental flaw with the Bank’s climate investment funds which is that they have been designed and promoted by donor countries with considerable stealth and speed and without significant input from developing countries. Stakeholder comments were only invited on the blueprint drafted by Bank staff and approved by potential donor countries. There was no opportunity to discuss whether or not the Bank was the most appropriate institution to be helming this initiative.

The UK, US and Japan view the CIF as a key G8 deliverable and hope to announce the funds at the G8 summit in Hokkaido, Japan in July. According to the World Bank, the three countries have pledged a total of $5.5 billion to the funds and are inviting other donors to join them in establishing the funds. The UK government, for example, has already pledged 800 million pounds sterling ($1.5 billion) to capitalise the climate investment funds through its Environmental Transformation Fund International Window (ETF-IW). These resources will be disbursed primarily through concessional loans rather than grants, another source of criticism from developing countries and civil society groups.

The new draft proposals for the CIF insist that the initiative “will be an interim measure designed for the MDBs to assist in filling immediate financing gaps” pending an agreement for a financial mechanism under the UNFCCC. According to the SCF and CTF proposals, the climate investment funds will include specific sunset clauses “linked to the agreement on the future of the climate change regime” and that the funds “will take necessary steps” to conclude their operations “once a new financial architecture [under the UNFCCC] is effective”.

However, this means that the sunset clauses will be contingent upon the establishment of a UNFCCC fund or funds with no explicit specification of a date for the conclusion of such funds. “A sunset clause that does not specify when the sunset is meaningless,” added the developing country negotiator.

Moreover, there is evidence that many such “interim” funds established under the auspices of the World Bank have expanded rather than shrunk over the years, such as the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) aimed at providing a temporary instrument for pioneering carbon transactions while the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) - the Kyoto Protocol’s mechanism for carbon trading - was being developed and made operational. According to a report by the Washington-based think tank, the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network (SEEN), nine years on and $2 billion later, “the World Bank’s carbon portfolio has expanded to 11 funds and carbon financing has become a mainstream’ part of its overall lending program”.

There is also no guarantee that the resources from the CIF will be transferred to a UNFCCC fund. The new proposals merely state that upon termination of the SCF and CTF, the trustee (in this case, the World Bank), “will endeavour to transfer donors’ pro-rata shares to another fund which has a similar objective as the [SCF or CTF] as determined by the Trust Fund Committee[s]” unless the donors choose to have their shares returned.

Consequently, while the new proposals allude to the UNFCCC, they reflect a poor understanding of the status and terms of the Convention and their implications for developed and developing country parties to the treaty. Moreover, the concerns which have been raised by developing countries and civil society groups about the design of the funds and the nature of the process by which they have been proposed, have not been seriously taken into account.

Primarily, the proposed funds continue to be premised on an aid framework for climate financing placing climate change financing on a donor-recipient platform for engagement rather than as resources disbursed to meet commitments under international law. The creation of the CIF also supports the World Bank’s increasing encroachment into climate change financing and policymaking, a role which has been heavily criticised given its track record on the environment.

According to Bank documents, the Strategic Climate Fund will be comprised of targeted programmes aimed at providing financing to pilot new approaches to reduce carbon emissions and create greater climate resilience in developing countries while the Clean Technology Fund is aimed at accelerating transformation to low-carbon economies through cost effective mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and the development and deployment of “clean technologies” in developing countries.


Gene Giants: Climate saviors or profiteers?

June 3, 2008

TheRealNews, May 2008

Biotech companies seek hundreds of patents for genetically modified “climate-ready” seeds


Discredited strategy

May 25, 2008

*Patrick McCullyThe Guardian, May 21 2008

Increasing allegations of corruption and profiteering are raising serious questions about the UN-run carbon trading mechanism aimed at cutting pollution and rewarding clean technologies.

Download the International Rivers’ third annual “Dams, Rivers & People” report  

The world’s biggest carbon offset market, the Kyoto Protocol’s clean development mechanism (CDM), is intended to reduce emissions by rewarding developing countries that invest in clean technologies. In fact, evidence is accumulating that it is increasing greenhouse gas emissions behind the guise of promoting sustainable development. The misguided mechanism is handing out billions of dollars to chemical, coal and oil corporations and the developers of destructive dams - in many cases for projects they would have built anyway.

According to David Victor, a leading carbon trading analyst at Stanford University in the US, as many as two-thirds of the supposed “emission reduction” credits being produced by the CDM from projects in developing countries are not backed by real reductions in pollution. Those pollution cuts that have been generated by the CDM, he argues, have often been achieved at a stunningly high cost: billions of pounds could have been saved by cutting the emissions through international funds, rather than through the CDM’s supposedly efficient market mechanism.

And when a CDM credit does represent an “emission reduction”, there is no global benefit because offsetting is a “zero sum” game. If a Chinese mine cuts its methane emissions under the CDM, there will be no global climate benefit because the polluter that buys the offset avoids the obligation to reduce its own emissions.

A CDM credit is known as a certified emission reduction (CER), and is supposed to represent one tonne of carbon dioxide not emitted to the atmosphere. Industrialised countries’ governments buy the CERs and use them to prove to the UN that they have met their obligations under Kyoto to “reduce” their emissions. Companies can also buy CERs to comply with national-level legislation or with the EU’s emissions trading scheme. Analysts estimate that two-thirds of the emission reduction obligations of the key developed countries that ratified Kyoto may be met through buying offsets rather than by decarbonising their economies.

Almost all the demand for CERs has so far come from Europe and Japan. In the next few years, Australia and Canada could become significant CER buyers. In the longer term, the US could become the largest single market for CDM offsets under legislation being debated. The climate plan by Republican presidential hopeful John McCain would allow supposed emission reductions in the US to be met through domestic and CDM offsets.

Around 2bn CERs are expected to be generated by the end of this phase of Kyoto in 2012. At their current price, project developers will sell around ?18bn-worth of CDM credits over the next five years. The CDM approved its 1,000th project on April 15. More than twice as many are making their way through the approvals process.

Marginal improvement

Any type of technology other than nuclear power can apply for credits. Even new coal plants, if these can be shown to be even a marginal improvement upon existing plants, can receive offset income. A massive 4,000MW coal plant on the coast of Gujarat, India, is expected soon to apply for CERs. The plant will spew into the atmosphere 26m tonnes of CO2 per year for at least 25 years. It will be India’s third - and the world’s 16th - largest source of CO2 emissions.

Many observers had hoped that the CDM would promote renewables and energy efficiency. Yet if all projects now in the pipeline generated the CERs they are claiming up to 2012, non-hydro renewables would attract only 16% of CDM funds, and demand-side energy efficiency projects just 1%. Only 16 solar power projects - less than 0.5% of the project pipeline ? have applied for CDM approval.

For a project to be eligible to sell offsets, it is supposed to prove that it is “additional”. “Additionality” is key to the design of the CDM. If projects would happen anyway, regardless of CDM benefits, then their offsets would not represent any reduction in emissions.

But judging additionality has turned out to be unknowable and unworkable. It can never be definitively proved that if a developer or factory owner did not get offset income they would not build their project or switch to a cleaner fuel supply- and would not do so over the decade for which projects can sell offsets.

The documents written by carbon consultants to justify why their
clients’ projects should be approved for CDM offsets contain enough lies to make a sub-prime mortgage pusher blush. One commonly used “scam” is to make a proposed project look like an economic loser on its own, but a profitable earner once offset income is factored in. Examples include the Indian wind developers who failed to tell the CDM about the lucrative tax credits their projects were earning.

Off-the-record, industry insiders will admit that deceitful claims in CDM applications are standard practice. The carbon trading industry lobby group, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), has stated that proving the intent of developers applying for the CDM “is an almost impossible task”. Industry representatives have complained that “good storytellers” can get a project approved, “while bad storytellers may fail even if the project is really additional”.

One glaring signal that many of the projects being approved by the CDM’s executive board are non-additional is that almost three-quarters of projects were already complete at the time of approval. It would seem clear that a project that is already built cannot need extra income in order to be built.

Michael Wara, a law professor and carbon trade analyst from Stanford University, and Victor show in a recent paper that “essentially all” new hydro, wind and natural gas fired projects being built in China are now applying for CDM offsets. If the developers are being truthful that their projects are additional, this implies that without the CDM virtually no hydro, wind or gas projects would be under construction in China. Given the boom in construction of power projects in China, the fact that it is government policy to promote these project types, and the fact that thousands of hydro projects have been built in China without any help from the CDM, this is simply not credible.

Additionality also creates perverse incentives for developing country governments not to bring in, or enforce, climate-friendly legislation. Why should a government voluntarily act to cap methane from its landfills or encourage energy efficiency if in doing so it makes these activities “business-as-usual”, and so not additional and not eligible for CDM income?

Waste gases

The project type slated to generate the most CERs is the destruction of a gas called trifluoromethane, or HFC-23, one of the most potent greenhouse gases, and a waste product from the manufacture of a refrigerant gas. Every molecule of HFC-23 causes 11,700 times more global warming than that of CO2. Because of this massive “global warming potential”, chemical companies can earn almost twice as much from selling CERs as from selling refrigerant gases. This has spurred concern that refrigerant producers may be increasing their output solely so that they can produce, and then destroy, more waste gases.

A rapidly growing industry of carbon brokers and consultants is lobbying for the CDM to be expanded and its rules to be weakened further. If we want to sustain public support for effective global action on climate change, we cannot risk one of its central planks being a programme that is so fundamentally flawed. In the short term, the CDM must be radically reformed. In the long term it must be replaced.

*Patrick McCully is executive director of International Rivers