Phulbari Coal Project: critique of environment plans sets off alarms

December 14, 2008

UK-based GCM Resources’ ESIA of Bangladesh coal mine offers no comfort

Bank Information Center, 11 December 2008 | Washington, DC

The Phulbari Coal Project threatens numerous dangers and potential damages, ranging from the degradation of a major agricultural region in Bangladesh to pollution of the world’s largest wetlands. The project’s Summary Environmental Impact Assessment, and its full Environmental and Social Impact Assessment are replete with vague assurances, issuing many promises of future mitigation measures.

A report commissioned by Bank Information Center titled “Phulbari Coal: A Parlous Project” written by Roger Moody of Nostromo Research, UK makes the case that the integrated Phulbari coal mine, coal rail-river transport and coastal coal offloading project in Bangladesh is of such dimensions that it would prove highly challenging to implement in any country. It poses not only numerous socio-environmental problems, but also demands a highly sophisticated degree of regulatory adhesion, long-term monitoring and component implementation. The Asian Development Bank, which was actively considering funding the project until civil society organizations drew attention to its ill-prepared environment and social plans, would do well to support the development of a less controversial energy alternative for the country. 

BIC’s objective in commissioning this report was to provide Bangladeshi and international civil society organizations with user friendly expert critiques of the environmental and social assessments prepared by GCM/Asia Energy.  A critique of GCM/Asia Energy’s Involuntary Resettlement Plan for the Project was also commissioned by BIC and is publicly available on its website.

Summary of key points of Report:

  1. The Phulbari Coal Project threatens numerous dangers and potential damages.  These include the degradation of a major agricultural region in Bangladesh at a time of soaring food prices; pollution of the world’s largest wetlands; and a significant contribution to adverse global climate change.
  2. The project’s Environmental and Social Impact Assessment is full of vague assurances. It makes many promises of future mitigation measures that are inadequately defined and will almost certainly not be thoroughly implemented.
  3. The managing company, GCM Resources plc (Asia Energy), clearly has insufficient practical experience of a project of this magnitude.
  4. Both the “Precautionary Principle” and that of “Inter-generational Equity” will be severely compromised if the mine proceeds according to its present design. 
  5. The mine will profoundly affect both the quantity and quality of water available in the area of the mine footprint. 
  6. The likelihood of uncontrolled acid rock drainage has – by the project proponents own admission – not been adequately assessed; nor has the risk of a serious seismic event in the mine area.
  7. The project will cause a significant increase in emissions of airborne particulate matter with a direct impact on peoples’ health
  8. There is little evidence that project managers have the capacity to ensure that  proposed rehabilitation measures will actually work

READ THE FULL REPORT:

Phulbari: A Parlous Project, prepared by Nostromo Research, November 12, 2008 (Acrobat pdf, 368 KB)


ADB watchdog submits critique on Safeguards Review

December 11, 2008

Network charges that poor quality of 2nd draft implies that President Kuroda has been unable to convince the ADB bureaucracy to uphold and support his vision of the ADB as the leading regional development organization on poverty alleviation and climate change.

The 250-member strong NGO Forum on ADB submitted its detailed recommendations to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on the 2nd Draft Safeguard Policy Statement in the form of a Matrix which was compiled with analysis and contributions from its members. The Matrix and accompanying Narrative Summary elaborates how the dilution of existing policy has occurred in a multitude of ways in the 2nd draft Safeguard Policy Statement including:

  • The direct weakening of safeguard requirements;
  • The replacement of clear terms for implementation and processing requirements with vaguely worded language;
  • The lack of integration of safeguard principles with implementation measures and requirements for borrowers and clients;
  • The proposed wider use of “broad-brush” safeguard frameworks which are not envisioned under current Involuntary Resettlement and Indigenous Peoples policies;
  • The proposed use of complex “country safeguard systems” without any proposed increase in resource availability or supervision;
  • The proposed “derogation” or replacement of any or all safeguard requirements by individually negotiated “alternative approaches”;
  • The proposed increase in self-regulation, including the devolution of authority from the ADB to the Bank’s clients and borrowers for important safeguard assessment, monitoring and other functions;
  • The removal of language specifying a clear chain of command within the ADB for clear safeguard assessment, monitoring and compliance requirements.
  • The lack of any specific resource commitments for the increased monitoring and supervision necessary to oversee the new proposed requirements.

The Forum also released last week a report exposing the failure of the Asian Development Bank to implement its current safeguard policies. Titled “Towards the Cliff“, the report places the spotlight on key projects of the ADB plagued with violations of the ADB’s safeguards policies.

See also:

Complete collective comments of the NGO Forum on ADB network (Acrobat, pdf 984 KB)


Week of Global Action Against Debt and IFIs 2008

September 22, 2008

September 2008

We urge you all to join the Week of Global Action against Debt and International Financial Institutions – a week of various forms of citizen’s actions and mobilizations worldwide from October 12 to 19, 2008.

Download the call (PDF)

The Week includes many special dates:

October 12 – Continental day of resistance to colonialism and neocolonial neoliberalism (Americas)
October 13 – Day of Action against Debt, IFIs and Climate Change
October 14 – Day of Action against IFIs, Debt and Privatization
October 15 – Day of action for Debt Repudiation (anniversary of the death of Thomas Sankara, ex-president of Burkina Faso who called for debt repudiation just before his assassination)
October 16 – Day of Action for Food Sovereignty
October 17 – Day of Action against Poverty 

Together let us challenge and confront northern governments, international banks, transnational companies, and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO to take responsibility for debt domination and illegitimate debt.

Let us also demand past and present governments and government officials in the South to be accountable for their role in the debt problem.  Let us declare our readiness to stand in solidarity with those who choose to repudiate illegitimate debt. 

Let us pursue alternative and responsible financial relations, principles and standards to stop the re-accumulation of illegitimate debt.  These will involve major changes in international and national structures, processes and policies towards the establishment of equitable and just economic, financial and political relations.

Initial Conveners:
Global and Regional entities:
Jubilee South, CADTM International Network, Southern Peoples’ Alliance of Ecological Debt Creditors, Oilwatch South America, Jubilee South/Americas, Asia-Pacific Movement on Debt and Development/JS Asia and Pacific, Hemispheric Social Alliance (Americas)

National and locally-based entities:
Observatori del Deute en la Globalizació (Cataluña, Estado español), Irish Coalition on Debt and Development, Jubilee USA Network, Dialogue 2000 (Argentina), Jubilee South Network Brazil, Brazil Network on International Financial Institutions


Dhaka Wasa plans 20pc hike in water tariff

September 18, 2008
Dhaka Wasa is planning to increase water tariff by 20 percent, only after a month it slapped a five percent increase in tariff.   

Dhaka Wasa Managing Director (MD) engineer M Raihanul Abedin said, “The Board has approved increasing water tariff by 20 percent and the proposal has already been sent to the LGRD ministry for final decision.”

“The Dhaka Wasa Board has the mandate to increase tariff up to five percent annually. The Board increased tariff by five percent in July after three years. But it is not sufficient to meet the expenditure as the salary of Wasa employees were increased by 20 percent,” he said. 

He said due to frequent power outage, they have to run pumps often by generators, which is contributing to a rise in water lifting cost. 

However, the decision of increasing tariff without improving the service of Wasa facing systems loss has raised questions.

Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) Chairman Prof Muzaffer Ahmad said, “An organisation needs to tackle systems loss before increasing tariff.”

“Wasa should improve its service first,” he said, adding that it should conduct a survey before making such decisions.

However, the Dhaka Wasa MD is confident of providing the city residents with better service in the near future. 

“We shall install more water treatment plants to increase our production. Water supply in the city will improve after implementation of the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-funded Dhaka Water Supply Sector Development Programme at a cost of Tk 1,456 crore. Moreover, we shall purchase 75 generators,” he added.


Putting a price tag on poverty

September 4, 2008

Tanim Ahmed*, NewAge, September 4, 2008. Dhaka, Bangladesh

Poverty is not merely a bundle of economic goods with price tags upon them. It is not merely so much rice, so many pencils or paracetamol. It arises out of the lack of one’s ability to effectively participate in social life or the lack of one’s voice in political representation. It arises from one’s sense of insecurity. It arises from the desperation and frustration of not being able to provide for one’s children. It arises from the sense that one is deprived of the opportunities to live a better, or in this case, a more human life.

 

Photo: NewAge

TO BEGIN with an oversimplified example, let us assume that human well-being is measured by their ability to pay for haircuts – the more haircuts one is able to pay for the better off one is. A haircut would cost around $10 in New York and about Tk 20 in Dhaka. It would mean that two persons with the same earning, for instance $10 or Tk 700 per day, would have distinctly different purchasing powers. One would be able to pay for one haircut while the other 35. Since haircuts are the basis of well-being, the Bangladeshi would be 35 times better off than the American. Needless to say, it does not work out that way.
   

Well-being does not depend on the number of haircuts but a host of other more essential services and commodities. Services, as one would find in the case of haircuts, boot polishing or plumbing, are comparatively far costlier in developed countries than they are in poor countries like Bangladesh, especially when compared to the proportional differences in prices of other commodities like food and clothing. In other words, between rich and poor countries, prices of commodities vary less than those of services, i.e. purchasing power would not vary as much in case of those commodities as it would for services in the United States and Bangladesh.
   

Before even going into the latest poverty figures released by the World Bank on August 26 and what it implies, one must first question the benchmark for poverty expressed in purchasing capacity called Purchasing Power Parity. The much popular ‘dollar a day’ was expressed in this purchasing capacity terms across the world and meant to be equivalent to the purchasing capacity of $1 in the United States – the base country – in 1985, changed to $1.03 in 1993 and, according to the latest study, $1.25 in 2005. The question is what the equivalent of $1.25 in takas meant to purchase.
   

The bundle of choice for households or individuals in dire poverty would be distinctly different from those better off. The poor spend a high proportion of their income on basic needs whereas those better off spend a lesser proportion on such items with a substantial portion of their incomes purchasing services. But such benchmarks are derived from national accounts and a more general pattern of consumption in different countries. There are two obvious problems here. Even in Bangladesh’s case, although services contribute about half the GDP consumption pattern of individuals or households living in poverty would hardly reflect such a trend. Secondly, the poor buy commodities in much small quantities that would naturally mean that they end up paying more in the long run – buying a few hundred milligrams of cooking oil instead of a five-litre pack for instance.
   

Another recent study by the Asian Development Bank strives to capture that precise difference attempting to arrive at a more balanced poverty benchmark for Asia. It shows that the bottom 30 per cent of the Bangladeshi population spend 65.6 per cent of their household expenditure on food and drink while the average household spends just over half. In purchase power terms $1 dollar translates into about Tk 14 according to general consumption patterns but it is about Tk 25 according to household consumption patters. What it means is that the poverty benchmark translates into a higher purchasing power when considered on the basis of general consumption but far lower when considered on the basis of household consumption. When Tk 14 is considered equivalent to the ‘dollar a day’ benchmark, it means that an individual would be able to procure enough commodities and services to escape poverty spending Tk 14 every day. In the other case it would mean that the individual requirement to escape poverty would be Tk 25.
   

The two figures could make substantial difference as regards the number and percentage of poor people in Bangladesh and challenge the government’s claimed progress in poverty reduction, especially in the context of Millennium Development Goals. It is not that attainment of these UN development goals would mean substantial improvement in the economic system that inherently breeds poverty, but the new statistics and benchmarks would certainly cause governments to revise their statistics and review their supposed progress based on this new information.
   

A new working paper from the World Bank, ‘The Developing World Is Poorer Than We Thought, But No Less Successful in the Fight against Poverty’, by two of its economists, Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion, revised the previous poverty benchmark to the equivalent of $1.25 in 2005 in the United States, instead of the $1.03 in 1993. This revision saw the number of poor people increase from about 879 million, as reported by the World Bank earlier, to almost 1.4 billion. That is a difference of over half a billion people living in extreme poverty.
   

As other estimates and analyses point out, revision of these benchmarks by small margins result in huge differences in the numbers and as Sanjay Reddy, an assistant professor of economics at Columbia University in the United States, points out, such a difference in result with slight changes in the benchmark would render the benchmark itself ‘unfit for use’ in most cases pertaining to economic statistics. According to analyses, if the benchmark is revised upwards to $1.45 in 2005, which is closer to $1.03 in 1993 in terms of prices, then the number of poor increases to 1.72 billion. If the year 2005, on the other hand, is taken back to 2003, the developing world’s poverty reduction rate shows substantial deterioration so as not to favour the claim made in the World Bank paper.
   

Then, of course, there is the factor of China and India that skews the overall poverty figures substantially and make allowances for the claim of having attained substantial poverty reduction, although sub-Saharan Africa’s number of poor have increased by all estimates. The Asian Development Bank’s set the poverty benchmark at an equivalent of $1.35 in 2005 in purchasing power, which according to the Key Indictors of the Asia and the Pacific 2008 is Tk 22.64 in 2005.
   

The general contention of most critical analyses regarding the World Bank’s poverty estimates is that it undercounts poverty and thereby projects a rosier picture of poverty. Critics, therefore, make the claim that poverty estimates should be made in a more inclusive manner taking into consideration a wider variety of data to make it more robust and acceptable.
   

Another point that must be made is that the global context has gone through significant transformation in the past two years with fuel and food prices rising phenomenally and inflation increasing markedly. During this time currencies have seen their purchasing power decrease and cost of living rise. In the case of Bangladesh, these months have also seen a perceptible increase in employment that could only mean further decrease of real wages.
   

Regardless of all the analyses and estimates and regardless of the robustness of whatever estimates are employed to ascertain poverty around the world, these estimates would necessarily concentrate on the precision of a certain bundle that should allow one to escape poverty. The central debate then would revolve around the precision of that bundle and its market price and how best to translate that value into a globally acceptable unit such as the purchasing power parity. The value of PPP dollars then would require further revision. However, this bundle would typically include ‘needs’ or ‘necessities’ that are tradable in the market; items that have a price tag to be more precise. Thus, it would include food, shelter, clothing, medicine and books but not such things as security or happiness or leisure, which should be considered as crucial when ascertaining even dire poverty.
   

The very proposition that an individual’s degree of happiness be included as a factor for assessing dire poverty might well be summarily dismissed considering that it is a luxury that not even the rich might claim to have. Let us consider the advertisement of a Bangladeshi mobile operator that captured the imagination of many. In ‘din bodlaise’ – roughly meaning ‘times have changed’ in English – the young boy in monochrome grows up to inherit the livelihood of his forefathers who were fishermen, but does not have to sell his catch to the parasitic middleman and therefore is ostensibly better off.
   

That young boy in monochrome had wanted to visit the fair and by evening, after his father had sold the entire catch for a paltry sum, realised that it was not to be. The look on his father’s face told him a visit to the fair was out of the question. It appears he tears himself away from the fireworks that shoot off the fairgrounds as night settles and his father tugs his hand. In the next generation that young boy, now a man, having sold his catch for a good price, takes up his young son – who has stood first in his class by the way – in his arms declaring that they would visit the fair that evening.
   

Poverty is not merely a bundle of economic goods with price tags upon them. It is not merely so much rice, so many pencils or paracetamol. It arises out of the lack of one’s ability to effectively participate in social life or the lack of one’s voice in political representation. It arises from one’s sense of insecurity. It arises from the desperation and frustration of not being able to provide for one’s children. It arises from the sense that one is deprived of the opportunities to live a better, or in this case, a more human life.
   

Agencies and organisation such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank will continue with their exercise to attain a better estimate for poverty and demonstrate how the market works to alleviate their poverty, if only to vindicate their work and justify their existence. Critics would dissect their methodology to prove them wrong. But that entire exercise is limited to putting a price tag on poverty. However, the question for governments must be one of principle – how they regard poverty. As an institution that serves the citizens and must look towards the welfare of the common people, attainment of a price tag must not suffice.

*Tanim Ahmed: tanimahmed@gmail.com


Phulbari Day in Photos: Remembering the August 26 Martyrs

August 29, 2008

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Cloak and dagger over coal policy

August 21, 2008

Tanim Ahmed, NewAge, August 21, 2008

It appears that the draft coal policy began with a text heavily biased towards private investment and facilitating large margins of profit for the mining companies. Ideally, there should not be a problem with the private investor making large margins but not at the cost of national interests or doing away with all kinds of binding safeguards to protect the environment and livelihoods of thousands of people who would be displaced. 

 

The August 2006 protests at Phulbari. Photo— Andrew Biraj/NewAge

TWO years ago on August 26, a citizens’ platform led the locals to take to the streets protesting against a proposed open pit coalmine by a British mining company. The National Committee for the Protection of Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports, led a procession of some 70,000 people from around the Phulbari township protesting against Asia Energy’s project that would see most of them become landless. Law enforcement agencies opened fire on the reasonably peaceful assembly just as it was about to break at the end of the day’s programme. Three people were killed, dozens were injured either by gunshot or when the law enforcers charged batons. What followed has become one of the celebrated instances of popular resistance leading to an agreement between the people of Phulbari and the government of the day. Like most other popular movements, the events of Phulbari Day was actually a culmination of almost a year’s campaign and mass awareness programmes undertaken by the citizens’ platform, popularly known as the Oil Gas Committee.
   

The local inhabitants found that this mining company gave out contradictory and sometimes erroneous information. They had little idea that the coalmine would gobble up their lands and that they would have to be relocated and begin life afresh. Although Asia Energy claimed to have conducted consultations with a few thousand households, only a few people admitted to having spoken to their representatives and refused to acknowledge those meetings as ‘consultations’ in which they had apparently agreed to the establishment of a coalmine in the area.
   

Misgivings still remain and a report published in the New Nation on August 20 does not do much allay them. Neither does a column by Mohammad Nurul Islam, a member of the coal policy drafting committee, published in Prothom Alo on August 4. Both the pieces relate to the finalised coal policy that has now been submitted for approval by the council of advisers. The report, citing sources in the Energy Division and those present at the meeting of the council in Chittagong last week, states that there were strong differences among the advisers over the amount of royalty and land acquisition issue. Apparently, it was the contention of some of the advisers that the recommended 13 per cent royalty was high and private quarters would not be interested to invest with such a high rate. Recommendations regarding the method of mining, rehabilitation of the dislocated inhabitants of the mine area and land acquisition also featured in the discussion. The policy was eventually sent back to the Energy Division with a recommendation from the council to shorten it and remove ambiguities, following which it might again be placed for approval in December.
   

In his column, Nurul Islam, a professor of the Institute of Appropriate Technology of the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, states plainly that if the coal policy is approved by the council of advisers as it is, it would undermine national interests and favour the mining companies. He goes on to make several recommendations.
   

The initial proposal by Asia Energy, now Global Coal Management, in 2005, according to which Bangladesh would receive only six per cent royalty from extracted coal, was controversial and strongly criticised by different quarters. The misgivings would not appear unfounded given the context and process through which the Asia Energy project has come about.
   

Although the stipulated royalty for open pit coalmine was fixed at 20 per cent by the law prevailing till December 1995, the Bureau of Mineral Development entered into an agreement with BHP Billiton in August 1994 settling on a royalty rate of just six per cent for an open pit mine in Phulbari. Just one month before, the bureau had entered into another agreement with Petrobangla for Barapukuria at a royalty of 20 per cent. This was the first instance of irregularity betraying machinations in favour of a foreign investor.
   

The relevant law was modified in December 1995 stipulating six per cent royalty for open pit and five per cent for shaft mining of coal. When the BHP handed over their contract to Asia Energy, the government was not notified in due time.
   

The royalty rate remains an issue even today as both the report and Nurul Islam’s column points out. He recommends that this rate should be fixed at 15 per cent. But the council of advisers, according to the report, deemed 13 per cent to be too high. M Tamim, the special assistant to the chief adviser in charge of the energy ministry, however, pointed out that in other countries taxes are much higher than in Bangladesh and argued that the proposed rate was justified.
  

In its feasibility study, Asia Energy proposed that the open pit mine would to take up some 65 square kilometres although the prevailing law stipulated that it should not be more than eight square kilometres.


Once Asia Energy’s initial proposal came under fire from even the bureaucrats, particularly those heading the energy and mineral resources divisions of the energy ministry in 2005, there was a largely unanimous recommendation that it would be assessed under a coal policy that would be formulated. Since then, there has been little talk of a comprehensive energy policy or a mining policy encompassing all the different aspects.
   

The first draft was prepared and finalised on December 1, 2005 and a second draft by January 23 the following year. The two were made public and discussed. Both the drafts appeared as if they had been formulated in such a manner so as to accommodate the proposals of Asia Energy and the Indian Tata group, which was at that time vying for an open pit mine in Barapukuria as part of its $3 billion investment proposal in Bangladesh. The drafts allowed for substantial coal exports and projected such a level of extraction for which there would not be sufficient demand in the local market. The high rate of coal extraction was advocated in order to ‘ensure energy security’ for the country but would have eventually meant export of large amounts of coal.
   

The drafts were duly criticised but subsequent drafts still retained provisions facilitating exports and coal extraction in an open pit method of mining without concrete safeguards for adverse environmental impacts or rehabilitation of the local inhabitants that include a few thousand people of ethnic minority communities. The coal policy went through six drafts till June 2007 when a high-powered committee was formed with former BUET vice-chancellor Abdul Matin Patwary as chairman. The Patwary Committee, comprising eight members, was charged with analysing the sixth draft and finalising the coal policy.
   

Interestingly, this committee did not include Nurul Islam on some vague ground, but the members co-opted him into it nonetheless. The sixth version of the policy, dated June 21, 2007, was made available on the internet and public opinion was sought on it. This version remains the only one available in the public domain. Although it was put in the public domain claiming more openness, the subsequent versions were never made available. The seventh version that the Patwary Committee finalised also went through a relatively transparent and apparently participatory process with members of the media present at the meetings and different interested quarters welcome to make their submissions and deliberations. The seventh draft was submitted to the secretary for energy and mineral resources in January 2008. Since then the energy division has been working on the draft and, according to Nurul Islam, has changed the draft for the worse.
   

It appears that the draft coal policy began with a text heavily biased towards private investment and facilitating large margins of profit for the mining companies. Ideally, there should not be a problem with the private investor making large margins but not at the cost of national interests or doing away with all kinds of binding safeguards to protect the environment and livelihoods of thousands of people who would be displaced. But the process was such that with every draft the interest of the private quarters were diluted a little and provisions tweaked around a little to allow marginal benefits to Bangladesh. The Patwary Committee, therefore, had a huge task on its hand to turn the entire draft around and produce one that favoured national interests over anything else.
   

Given the controversy and criticisms, the committee members went out of their way to specify a number of provisions and even stipulated the constitution of the coal development committee. This appears to be the main complaint against them now, that they went beyond their mandate and produced something that is more like a policy and act put together. It should have been appreciated that the committee did extra work just to ensure all the bones of contention were covered. Now it seems, however, that the final draft will go through another round of modifications.
   It increasingly seems that just because the coal is there, it must be extracted and used. But there is yet to be a thorough cost-benefit analysis. There is yet to be any concrete plan that would duly quell the apprehensions of the local populace by proving that they would end up being better off if the coal mine is established and they are relocated. There is yet to be any analysis about the extent of water table draw down due to continuous flushing out of groundwater, which could have telling impact on an otherwise food surplus region.
   

There is also the consideration that this particular project happens to be related to mineral extraction and that too of fossil fuel. It is a matter of historical and anecdotal experience, as well as being the finding of an academic research by an internal evaluation of the World Bank titled ‘Striking a Better Balance’, that investment in fossil fuel extraction, be it oil, gas or coal, are typically predatory and add little to the overall development of the host economy. In fact, these investments create indirect hindrances to wholesome development and contribute to slower sustainable growth of the recipient or host economies.
   

Investments in the gas sector should suffice as learning experiences. None of the two companies have till today compensated for the blowouts that they were responsible for. There is no guarantee that Asia Energy will not follow in their footsteps. That Bangladesh immediately needs to develop its natural resources to meet future and current energy demands cannot be denied. But it cannot be at the cost of food security and livelihoods of thousands of people or irreversible environmental destruction that open pit mines have been proven to cause across the world. There is also the matter of population density that experts often point out. They say there has never been an open pit mine in such densely populated areas like Bangladesh where there are almost 1,100 people per sq km as opposed to three in Canada and Australia, 32 in United States or even 368 in India.
   

As far as Phulbari is concerned and as far as Asia Energy is concerned, the local populace will renew their pledge on August 26. Their message is a simple one. No to open pit. No to exports. No to foreign companies.


‘You cannot eat coal’: resistance in Phulbari

August 19, 2008

NewAge, August 19, 2008. Dhaka, Bangladesh

Those who campaign against the ruthless exploitative practices of trans-national mining companies say, increased investment results in human rights abuses, especially against rural communities which the companies want to dislocate and uproot. They also say that the role of the state in extractive sector governance and citizens’ protection diminishes, while its role in protecting and promoting the interests of trans-national corporations increases. One sees that happening in Phulbari, over Asia Energy’s proposed Phulbari coal project, writes Rahnuma Ahmed

 The August 2006 protests at Phulbari. Photo: Andrew Biraj

‘Only when the last tree has withered, and the last fish caught, and the last river been poisoned, will we realise we cannot eat money.’
   

Cree proverb
   


   ‘[the] uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time.’
   

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1975
   
   

‘You cannot eat coal’
   

‘No, we do not want the coalmine. What will we eat?’ said an elderly woman. I was watching raw, uncut video footage from Phulbari, shot by media activists Zaeed Aziz and Farzana Boby, a couple of days after the killings occurred on August 26, 2006.
   

Another woman steps into the frame. She vents bitterly, we work daily for our subsistence, we eat from what we earn. That is all we have. If this land is turned into a coalmine, those who eat in exchange of daily wages, where will they go? Where will we live? How will we survive?
   

Zaeed and Farzana’s film, ‘The Blood-Soaked Banner of Phulbari’, was released soon after the killings in 2006. I watch the beginning sequence. A crowd of men stand at the long-distance bus stand in Phulbari town, they talk to each other and to the film crew. ‘We are poor people,’ says a man, probably in his late-thirties. ‘If I lose my home, how will I earn a living? What use will be the coalmine?’ Who will it benefit?
   

I return to clips from their uncut footage. A younger woman is sitting in her courtyard, ‘No, I don’t have a husband, I live with my mother, I work with her. In the same place. If the coalmine comes, we, that is, us mothers-and-daughters, where will we go? We will be scattered from our relatives, we will lose our ties.’
   

‘Where will we go?’ This question is repeatedly raised by villagers, by both men and women, old and young, by farmers, day-labourers, petty businessmen, schoolchildren, college-going youths, both Bengalis and adivasis, who belong to Santal, Oraon, Pahan, Mahali and Munda communities. By Hindus and Muslims.
   

‘Two coalmines have been built in neighbouring areas,’ one of the men standing at the bus-stand in the Blood-Soaked Banner documentary had said. ‘What development has it brought, tell me?’
   

I turn to Ronald Halder and Philip Gain’s film, ‘Phulbari’, an activist film released by SEHD earlier this year. Abdul Jalil of village Chouhati turns his face away in pent-up anger when asked how he has benefited from the coalmine in Barapukuria. ‘Benefit? How have I benefited? It has crippled me. I cannot describe the damage it has done. Those who have benefited from it have. We have been devastated.’
   

Azizunessa of the same village does not mince her words. She too has suffered from the Barapukuria coalmine. ‘We are poor people, we raise a cow, a goat or two. But the security guards, they do not let us enter, they do not allow us to cut even a blade of grass. So how does the coalmine that they have built, help us? How do I get my bowl of rice? They do not give me work in the coalmines. My sons have no food. How will they live? Only Allah knows what our situation is like. How our days pass. Or don’t. I did agricultural work, I winnowed paddy, I worked, I ate, I brought in one and a half seers of rice from the house I worked in, I fed the children. Work is not something that appears out of nowhere, that daughters-in-law can bring, that poor people can give each other. Why is it that the coalmine has stopped me from working, from feeding myself? The coalmine is protected by barbed wire fences, it is surrounded by high walls. Why?’ Who benefits from the coalmine?
   

The Phulbari coal project plans to extract coal using open-pit mining method in seven unions and one municipality in four upazilas of Phulbari, Birampur, Nawabganj and Parbatipur in Dinajpur district. The company behind the $1.4-billion project is Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the British-registered Global Coal Management Resources Pls. According to Asia Energy, 40,000 people would be involuntarily resettled, 10,000 hectares, primarily of fertile agricultural land, would be required for mine and associated infrastructure. Activists say the number of people evicted is likely to be ten times more. The proposed coal project would divert a river, suck an aquifer dry for thirty years, the life span of the project. Dynamite explosion, environmentalists say, would cause noise and dust pollution, this would be increased by the trucks and trains that will haul away the coal to the port in Sundarban. To prevent flooding, huge pumps will pump out 800 million litres of water daily, from the mine. This will lower the groundwater in an area covering 500 square kilometres. Air and water pollution is likely to spread to surrounding water bodies. Asia Energy plans to create a huge lake after the project is over, but activists predict that the water is likely to be toxic.
   

GCM has a sustainable development manager who guides their approach. But the global record of mining operations rejects the sustainable development myth. Roger Moody, international researcher and campaigner against exploitation caused by multinational mining, writes in ‘Rocks and Hard Places: The Globalization of Mining’, lesser-developed countries, those with a high degree of dependence on mining, show slower rates of economic growth than their peers. Some countries, he writes, have been worse off. Potosi, a region that has been mined for silver for five centuries, is one of the poorest in Bolivia. Closer home is Orissa, Bihar and Jharkand which provide most of India’s minerals. Bihar has been for many years India’s ‘least developed’ state, while Orissa, in 2005, was ranked as the ‘poorest’ in the country. Mined regions even in advanced and middle-income countries have been the last to share in aggregated wealth. In 1870, Cornwall had 2,000 tin and copper mines. When the last pit was closed in 1998, Cornwall had the highest proportion of low-paid workers. Mineral-dependent economies, largely in Africa, are more likely to experience zero or even negative growth, since labour and capital move away from sustainable sectors to the extractive sector, and domestic products lose their competitive edge on international markets.
   

And of course, ‘understanding’ risks, albeit from a safe distance, is not the same as being willing to undergo it oneself. Recently, activists from the Alberta Environmental Network showed up at the Oil and Gas Investment Symposium in Calgary, Canada, held by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. The event brought together 85 companies and 375 investors from Canada, the US, and around the world. Those present at the meeting were offered drinking water that Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation peoples claim is toxic. They experience high rates of rare cancers and auto-immune diseases, which they believe are linked to the development of the tar sands.
   

None of the producers/owners, investors, CEOs drank the water.
   
   

26th August 2006
   

On August 26, 2006, more than 50,000 people took part in protests against the proposed mine, in Phulbari town. People from adjoining towns and villages poured in. The Bangladesh Rifles, a paramilitary force, opened fire on the protesters. Three young men, Tariqul, son of the municipal commissioner and panel chairman, Ameen, a young carpenter, and Salehin of the adjoining upazila Nawabganj died instantly. One to two hundred people are reported to have been injured in the violence unleashed by the BDR and police.
   

I turn to Zaeed and Boby’s uncut video footage. A woman describes angrily, ‘It was around maghreb, just before the call for prayers, the photographers had left, TV reporters too, that’s when they attacked us.’ To leave no photographic evidence? Another woman butts in, ‘We had chased out the police, I was so furious, I have never had the courage before, since that day I have learnt how to fight. Now, I have limitless courage. I am not afraid to die.’ The woman speaking earlier returns to her story, ‘The military [read BDR] began beating up people, they entered into our homes, they tore down the tin roofs.’ She is indignant, ‘These are people who are meant to protect us, they are law-enforcers.’ Another woman speaks up, ‘Did any of them die? They never do. Did any of them suffer any injuries?’
   

A woman who was badly beaten says, ‘The BDR entered our villages, they went from house to house. How dare they enter our villages? So we chased them out. But then they regrouped, they came after us. I couldn’t escape, they caught me and beat me very badly.’ The shot shows other women in the courtyard, nodding their heads as they listen.
   

Off-screen I hear a female voice, ‘Can the government ever defeat the janata?’ A woman wearing a printed sari on-screen says, ‘It is the government which breeds terrorists, they tear down the shops of poor people, they snatch away cigarettes and other items, they break these little cigarette stalls that are run by young boys for a living.’ Another off-screen voice, also a woman’s, speaks up, ‘Ordinary people are never terrorists.’
   

Most of the women, in no uncertain words, condemned Khaleda Zia, the then prime minister, for having sold out the interests of the country. What kind of a woman is she? Sending soldiers after us, dragging our husbands out of our homes. Does she want to make us widows? Their language was laced with four-letter words, often directed at her, at times at the then energy ministry adviser, Mahmudur Rahman, sometimes at the whole cabinet. I brought up the issue with Nurul Kabir, the editor of this paper. He said with a wry smile, ‘I am most respectful of subaltern languages, but wouldn’t it offend bhodrolok sensibilities?’ We laugh and talk about the gentrification of language, a class-ed mechanism of ruling. Who was it who had said there can be feelings without language, but no language without feelings? Was it not the historian Collingwood? I muse over issues of language, of home and belonging as I search the web and read through newspaper reports of the 26th, and after. I come across news reports stating the energy ministry adviser, Mahmudur Rahman, blamed a ‘small group of leftist parties without any influence whatsoever’ for orchestrating the deaths and injury to people at Phulbari. Asia Energy Bangladesh’s CEO Gary Lye’s words mirror Mahmudur Rahman’s, ‘It’s up to the government, but it would appear to us that the unforgivable events and the needless loss of life and suffering that took place in Phulbari are entirely the fault of the organisers.’
   

Those who campaign against the ruthless exploitative practices of trans-national mining companies say, increased investment results in human rights abuses, especially against rural communities which the companies want to dislocate and uproot. They also say that the role of the state in extractive sector governance and citizens’ protection diminishes, while its role in protecting and promoting the interests of trans-national corporations increases. One sees that happening in Phulbari, over Asia Energy’s proposed Phulbari coal project.
   

Mozammel member, a pourasabha member, says in defence of the project, ‘If the government wishes it, how can we prevent it from happening?’ People around him ask, ‘But why do you want the coalmine? Can you not see that it is not in the interests of the people?’ His answer is cruel and simple, ‘We are not for the people. We are for the government.’
   
   

The compensation story
   

In the Blood-Soaked Banner, a man who describes himself as a petty businessman says, ‘Yes, the coal project will bring benefits to some, to those who have built three-storey buildings in the town, those who have made plans of where to relocate, where to build new homes, the businesses that they will start, even, what kind of houses they will build for themselves.’ It will benefit those already-privileged, those who are townspeople. But not those who live off the land, those who make a living from agriculture, from day-labour, and the innumerable number of ways through which poor people make a living. In other words, the majority.
   

Abdul Jalil of Chouhati, Barapukuria was asked about the compensation that he had received from the government. ‘They gave it in little, little instalments, it took ages, the money dried up as I walked back and forth to collect it.’ Compensation is also tied up with land deeds and titles, a method of possession and ownership that is antagonistic to the adivasi tradition, and their claims to ancestral land. That is probably why Lawrence Tudu of Buski, Birampur says, ‘We will not leave this village, we will not leave our homestead, we will not leave the soil, if necessary, my remains will get buried under this soil.’
   

Poor people’s claims to compensation are entangled in bureaucracy, and in corporate controlled channels of profiteering. Corporations themselves evade responsibility and accountability as one sees in Magurcchara and Tengratila, where international oil companies have shown great reluctance to pay compensation for the miserable accidents that have occurred.
   

And compensation for killings? Ameen’s mother when asked said yes, I have received two lakh taka from the government, as compensation. And another twenty thousand from Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League, the then opposition party (interestingly enough, it was the Awami League government that awarded the licensing agreement to Asia Energy, in 1998). But, she says, I hurt, I grieve for my son. I raised him, does compensation lessen my loss? Will money ever call out ‘ma’, or ‘baba’?
   
   

Democracy, a world of power
   

Democracy, writes historian and subaltern theorist Partha Chatterjee in his recent work, ‘The Politics of the Governed’, is no longer government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Twentieth-century techniques of governing population groups, widespread acceptance of the idea of popular sovereignty, the creation of governmental bodies that administer populations but do not provide its citizens with arenas of democratic deliberation, these conditions, says Chatterjee, give rise to democracy becoming a world of power. A world which has startling dimensions, and unwritten rules of engagement.
   

I see the people of Phulbari voice a collective identity, framed, at first, within the politics of electoral democracy. We have brought this government to power. How can they not do what we want? It is my vote that decides who will be the member of parliament. I elect the chairman. He must work for me, in my interests. A woman adds, what kind of a government is it that pushes us into waging movements? That destroys our peaceful lives, that takes away our sons? We want to return to our normal lives. Increasingly, people’s voices become more assertive. If the government does not value us, we will not value them either. If the government will not provide for us, we do not need this government. We do not need any government.
   

Amidst the strident assertiveness, a peasant’s words ring out clearly, ‘I am a khetmojur, I till the land. It is the crops I grow that feed the leaders. Am I more valuable, or they?’
   

Whether elected or un-elected, all governments, both leaders and state functionaries, need to be fed. They would be well-advised to listen to the voices of those who produce. After all, one cannot eat coal. Or money, either.


ADB Denials Frustrate Civil Society Groups: Annual Report Suggests Gaps in Routine Disclosure

July 19, 2008

By Toby McIntosh, July 17, 2008 freedominfo.org

As its Public Communications Policy nears its third anniversary, the Asian Development Bank is coming up short of its own targets for routinely disclosing information and has frustrated civil society groups by denying several access requests.

The ADB’s second report on the policy shows progress toward disclosure goals, but also indicates some gaps.  For example, almost two-thirds of the key documents describing potential public sector projects were posted late, and 17 percent of the time no documents were posted. Required summaries of Board meetings were not issued almost one-third of the time.

And the first experiences with the ADB’s appeals process have not satisfied information requesters who feel the bank is not showing flexibility congruent with its stated goal of having a presumption of disclosure. 

Most recently, the Bank declined to release a document describing its proposal for a lending mechanism which introduces new Bank procedures for approving and financing projects. The refusal to disclose it came despite a commitment in the communications policy to release draft documents and seek public comments when the Bank contemplates making broad policy changes.

In this case, the R-Paper (“R” stands for “Restricted”) about “Mainstreaming the Multitranche Financing Facility” was not considered by the Bank to be equivalent the “safeguard policies and sector or thematic strategies” that are subject to more participatory procedures. Several groups who closely follow the ADB disagreed, considering it a sweeping change, but their initial requests were turned down.

The Bank Information Center, the NGO Forum on the ADB and four other groups appealed the denials, arguing that the evaluation of the three-year pilot project and the recommendations on expanding the program were of sufficient importance to merit release before the Board meeting.  The request was denied, the ADB noting that the paper would be disclosed after the Board acted.

It was the third unsuccessful test of the ADB’s appeal mechanism, overseen by the Public Disclosure Advisory Committee, a body made up of Bank officials. Earlier in 2008, the committee rejected access to documents requested by Central Asian NGOs to documents about the Bishkek Heating Plant (Loan 1443-KGZ (SF): Power and District Heating Rehabilitation Project.

In particular, civil society groups sought aide memoires and Back-to-Office reports prepared in recent years by Bank staff members about the controversial project begun in 1996 and completed in December 2007. Zulfia Marat, with the Bureau of Human Rights and Rule of Law in Bishkek City, Krygyz Republic, wrote on April 28 requesting the information, noting that “after unusual cold winter 2007-2008 we have received many claims from our citizens on problem with heat…”

‘Wide Fissure of Distrust’

Following the appeals body’s denial , the Central Asia and Caucasus Network of the NGO Forum on the ADB on June 19 issued a statement lamenting  that the Bank has created a wide fissure of distrust between the ADB and civil society groups. “Civil society has a central role to play in monitoring and stopping possible wrongdoing masquerading as development.” said Marat.

The press release further states: “According to the project design, at the end of the implementation, the capital of Kyrgyz Republic should have been equipped with a modern, fully functional heating plant. Instead by the end of June 2007, the government adopted a law that allowed the privatization of the Bishkek Heating Power Plant (HPP). The government has also failed to provide any project-related documents, including the final outcome of the project, to public.”

Access to such project oversight documents has long been a goal of ADB observers, but was not included in the ADB’s 2005 Public Communications Policy. 

The bank denied the request for the information under Paragraph 126.3 (“Information obtained in confidence from a government or international organization that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to materially prejudice ADB’s relations with that party.”). The appeals body opined further that the information also would be protected under provisions 126.1 and 126.2 concerning the protection of ADB internal deliberations. Some of the information requested, the ADB noted, was included in a Project Completion Report. 

The first request to the appeal committee also was turned down, this one by the Bank Information Center. BIC asked that the PCP be amended so that the disclosure of policy and strategy paper not be linked to the disclosure of the chairman’s summary, which usually is finalized weeks after Board action, thus delaying release of the policy or strategy paper. 

A bank official replied that the ADB was willing to informally accept the idea, but would not formally alter the communications policy until its formal review, scheduled for 2010. This rejection of interim alterations came notwithstanding that the Bank in 2007 amended its policy to allow for the disclosure of project procurement-related audit reports. The latest report indicates that some operational manual instructions have been instituted with regard to new procedures for country strategy documents.

106 Requests Per Month

A little to the ADB’s surprise,  the number of requests for information is actually on the rise, up to 1,703 for the period of September 2006 to December 2007, 106 per month, according to the latest assessment report. Bank officials had expected proactive disclosure to reduce the number of requests. The 26-page report was issued in March and provides a candid view of the PCP. It is the second such report.

About six percent of the requests are denied, according to the report, mostly to protect private sector information. Fulfilling a request took an average of seven days.

Most of the requests (58 percent) are for general project-related information, with the next most common category being for information in the “employment, consulting and procurement category (11 percent).

The largest single category of denials is for “pricing supplements for bond deals,” but not all requests for these documents are denied. According to information supplied by Bank officials to Freedominfo.org, the call on this is left to the lead arranger or underwriter of the bonds. “Some dealers of more structured bonds would object to disclosing especially if they feel that the pricing supplement contains proprietary information, but other dealers are fine with disclosing the document, especially if its just plain vanilla bonds,” an official said.

The ADB, unlike other international financial institutions, maintains an online log of requests and their disposition.

Routine Disclosures Lag

The report also provides numerous examples of ways in which the Bank has not met its deadlines for releasing materials, and in some cases has not released information at all.

The report concludes that implementation has “improved and strengthened,” but also that “timeliness must be improved.”

The Bank reported that it has posted “summary project information documents” (PIDS for 87 percent of projects “under administration” by Dec.31, 2007, up from previous posting levels, but below the 100 percent goal.

The posting of initial PIDs often was tardy. The initial PIDs are to be posted to the web not later than 30 days after approval of the concept paper for public sector projects and not later than 30 days before the date of Board consideration for private sector projects. Overall for the reporting period, 174 PIDS were posted, 85 percent of those that were due, the report says. Just 39 percent were posted on time according to the report. For public sector projects, 83 percent of those due were posted, and 36 percent were posted on time. For private sector projects 906 percent got posted, and 59 percent were on time.

The Bank also did not meet its objectives when it comes to releasing the “draft design and monitoring framework” (DMF) before a project appraisal mission. For public sector projects, 31 percent of MDFs were posted as drafts before appraisal. 

The Bank says it complied with disclosure requirements for environmental assessments, but didn’t do so well with resettlement planning and indigenous people planning documents. Also, the Bank said it was well short of its goals for publishing social and environmental monitoring reports.

“Reports and Recommendations of the President,” due out after Board approval of loans, were generally released within the prescribed time period.

However, the report said improvement is necessary on the release of final reports about technical assistance projects, noting that it lacked precise data.
 
For the time period studied, 48 reports by the Operations Evaluation Department were posted, all about public sector projects. “No evaluation reports on private sector projects were posted,” the report says without further explanation.    

The report also says that the Bank is out of compliance with its policies for posting chairman’s summaries of board discussions. Out of 21 meetings requiring such summaries, only 15 summaries were posted.

Overall, the report commented, “Progress in compliance in certain areas is still mixed but better than previously reported.”


NGOs demand better Safeguards Consultation from ADB

July 8, 2008

NGO Forum on ADB, Manila, The Philippines. 

Nothing less than an open and inclusive second Safeguards consultation is warranted for the Asian Development Bank to produce an effective policy that can protect affected communities and ecosystems according to ADB watchdog in Asia and the Pacific region, Europe and the United States.

Activists and advocacy groups belonging to the NGO Forum on ADB collectively petitioned the Bank on July 4 to put in place an over-all consultation process and agenda that would ensure meaningful dialogue with stakeholders, particularly civil society and affected peoples. 

In its letter to the ADB President, the Forum made strong recommendations on the proposed consultation agenda released by the Bank’s Safeguards Policy Team last June 19. The letter is reproduced in its entirety below. 

The Forum’s proposal covered and centered on the following issues: (1) translation requirements; (2) timing of the release of the second Safeguards Policy Statement (SPS) document and the start of the Manila consultation; (3) length of consultation with strong emphasis on a one-day consultation each for environment, involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples sections; (4) ADB’s process in accepting external comments on the SPS document; and (5) the number and composition of participants. In addition, the Forum asked for a possible legal roundtable discussion with the ADB’s Office of the General Counsel right after the Manila consultation. 

The network reminded the Bank that there was considerable disappointment and concern from civil society on the first SPS draft and the process of the first round of Safeguards consultation. The situation led Forum members and partners to walk away from several regional consultations

The ADB, which began its Safeguards Policy Update (SPU) in December 2005, officially announced in the Madrid Annual Governors Meeting last May that there will be a second multi-stakeholders consultation for the Safeguards. This was in response to outrage expressed by NGOs and ADB governors alike over the mediocre draft that the ADB had released. 

The ADB said plans to hold the second multi-stakeholder consultation in Manila this third quarter.

Letter to ADB

July 4, 2008

MR. HARUHIKO KURODA

President

Asian Development Bank

Dear Mr. Kuroda,

The decision of the ADB to release a second Safeguards Policy Statement and hold a follow-up regional consultation is a step in the right direction. Opportunities for meaningful dialogue with stakeholders, particularly civil society and representatives of affected communities, are vital in reaching the collective aim of crafting a relevant and effective Safeguards Policy. 

We welcome the invitation extended to civil society by the ADB to help craft the proposed consultation plan which the ADB Safeguards Policy Update team sent to our network on June 19. We also recognize the efforts of the ADB’s SPU Team to reach out to the NGO Forum.

Keeping in mind Forum’s recent experience with the initial consultation phase, which fell short of the expectations of many stakeholders, not just civil society, we would like to stress the need for an over-all consultation agenda and process that would encourage open, sincere and active participation from Bank staff and other stakeholders. We therefore respectfully propose for your consideration the following recommendations that we feel can better shape the consultation plan:

1) Translation
As an international financial institution guided by its own Translation Framework, we believe nothing less than high quality translation of the (a) second SPS draft and (b) simultaneous translation during the Manila consultation proper is warranted and necessary. Similar to the first consultation phase, language translations should be accomplished in, though not necessarily limited to, Russian, Bahasa, Chinese and Vietnamese by professional translators who are familiar with and are guided by experts with a strong grasp of financial and safeguard terms that will be used in the new draft. We feel very strongly that the absence of translation effectively discriminates against participants who do not use English as a first language. The same is true for non-English-speaking individuals who are not attending the consultation but would still like to comment on the second SPS document via the website. We ask that translated documents be released at the exact same time as the English version to be fair to every relevant stakeholder.

2) Timing
Given that there would be three important documents released at the same time (second SPS document, Operations Manual, and the comment-response matrix), we request for a 60-day period between the release of the last translation of the SPS document and the start of the Manila consultation. Such a period will provide the time required for stakeholders – especially Indigenous and affected peoples – to fully understand and digest the information the drafts contain as well as to undertake the analysis necessary for informed comment. Further, we ask for an additional two weeks time for written submissions after the Manila consultation, to enable us to finalize and submit our written inputs that would be jointly based on the second SPS document and the discussions in the Manila consultation.

3) Length of Consultation and Number of Consultations
We believe that the length of any public consultation is dependent on the structure and focus contained in the consultation agenda. In view of the fact that three policies will eventually be consolidated into one, we suggest that a one-day consultation be held for each policy section, namely, environment, involuntary resettlement, and Indigenous Peoples. Discussion should also include, inter alia, over-arching issues and other Safeguards documents for which we recommend an additional half day. 

Having accepted the invitation extended by the ADB to help its SPU team craft a meaningful agenda and as our contribution to shaping an effective process, we are finalizing a proposal which outlines the structure/format that would best address the needs of the Safeguards consultation. We will submit this to the SPU Team in the coming days.

4) Process of ADB’s Response on Inputs on 2nd SPS Document
In view of the time and logistical constraints of the face-to-face consultation on the second SPS document, the Bank should allow for receiving written comments on the draft from the day of its release until after the Manila consultation. ADB should post written submissions on its website on the date of receipt of respective comments. As requested in section 2, the deadline for written submission should be extended two weeks after the Manila consultation.

5) Regarding Participants
While we appreciate that the consultation plan has mentioned the criteria for selecting participants, it did not provide the estimated number of attendees nor the preferences by which the SPU team will extend its invitation. This matter is of great importance because it allows us to gauge the number of possible participants from civil society and affected people. It also helps everyone determine if there will be equitable distribution of number of seats based on stakeholder orientation and role in the consultation process. 

It is also vital to recognize that subjects that will be covered by the consultations will require particular expertise, concerning for instance the multidimensional, project-induced impoverishment risks confronting the involuntarily displaced and indigenous communities. We thus strongly recommend the participation of your senior economists in the process, along with specialists and leaders of professional associations to ensure a more robust discussion.

6) Legal Roundtable to Follow Consultation
Given the significant legal issues at stake with any significant restructuring of the safeguard policies, and following international best practice on updating safeguard issues, we believe the consultation must be accompanied by an additional legal roundtable event over which a diversity of legal experts, to be mutually agreed, on the issues facing indigenous peoples, resettlement and environment can openly discuss with the ADB’s Office of General Counsel the legal framework within which these safeguards sit.

Thank you for inviting civil society to help shape the process. We hope to receive an official, written response from your office on this urgent matter.

Very truly yours,

RENATO REDENTOR CONSTANTINO – NGO Forum on ADB
TITI SOENTORO – Nadi (Indonesia)
HELEN LEAKE – Forest Peoples Programme (UK)
RAMANANDA WANGKHEIRAKPAM – North East Peoples Alliance on Trade Finance and Development (Northeast India) 
DANA SADYKOVA – Ecomuseum of Karaganda (Kazakhstan)
ISAGANI SERRANO – Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
AHMED SWAPAN – VOICE (Bangladesh)
JESSICA ROSIEN – Oxfam Australia
PHILA POHTHMI – Greater Sylhet Indigenous Peoples Forum (Bangladesh)
JOANNA LEVITT – International Accountability Project (USA)
MISHKA ZAMAN – Bank Information Center (USA)
GURURAJA BUDHYA – Urban Research Centre (India)
THEODORE E. DOWNING – International Network on Displacement and Resettlement (USA)
SAODAT SAIDNAZAROVA – CSSC “Kalam” (Tajikistan)
DODARBEK SAIDALIEV – CSSC “Shahrvand” (Tajikistan)
SHYNAR IZTELEUOVA – NGO “TAN” (Kazakhstan)
PIETER JANSEN – Both ENDS (The Netherlands)
GALINA CHERNOVA – NGO “Globus” (Kazakhstan)
SERGEY VORSIN – Youth EcoCenter (Tajikistan)
KNUD VOCKING – Urgewald (Germany)
STEPHANIE FRIED – Environmental Defense (USA)
HEMANTHA WITHANAGE – Centre for Environmental Justice (Sri Lanka)
RUSTAM MURZAKHANOV – NGO Environmental Law Center “Armon” (Uzbekistan)
ULRIKE BEY – Asienhaus (Germany)
DILOROM ATABAEVA – CSSC Consortium of Initiatives (Tajikistan)
ZAKIR KIBRIA – BanglaPraxis (Bangladesh)
FABBY TUMIWA – Institute for Essential Services Reform (Indonesia)
POL VANDERVOORT – 11.11.11 (Belgium)
SOUPARNA LAHIRI – National Forum of Forest People & Forest Workers (India)

CC: 
Ursula Schaefer-Preuss, VP for Knowledge, Management and Sustainable Development
Xianbin Yao, Acting Director General, RSDD
Nessim Ahmad, Director, ESSD
Xiaoying Ma, SPU Team Head
Chantelle Duffy, SPU Administrative Manager
Bart Edes, NGO and Civil Society Center